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Status: Fixed
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Closed: Jul 12
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Windows Kernel nsiproxy/netio pool memory disclosure in the handling of IOCTL 0x120007 (NsiGetParameter)
Project Member Reported by mjurczyk@google.com, Apr 21 2017 Back to list
We have discovered that the handler of the 0x120007 IOCTL in nsiproxy.sys (\\.\Nsi device) discloses portions of uninitialized pool memory to user-mode clients, likely due to output structure alignment holes.

On our test Windows 7 32-bit workstation, an example layout of the output buffer is as follows:

--- cut ---
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ................
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................
000000a0: 00 00 00 00 ff 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ................
000000b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                         ........
--- cut ---

Where 00 denote bytes which are properly initialized, while ff indicate uninitialized values copied back to user-mode. As can be seen, a total of 13 bytes (out of 184) scattered across the structure are disclosed to the client application. The bug manifests itself through a call to the undocumented NSI!NsiGetParameter userland function, in the same fashion that it is called in WSDApi!CWSDInterfaceTable::GetInterfaceProfiles:

--- cut ---
.text:6EA52AFF                 push    eax
.text:6EA52B00                 push    ebx
.text:6EA52B01                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_BC]
.text:6EA52B07                 push    eax
.text:6EA52B08                 push    0
.text:6EA52B0A                 push    8
.text:6EA52B0C                 lea     eax, [ebp+InterfaceLuid]
.text:6EA52B12                 push    eax
.text:6EA52B13                 push    7
.text:6EA52B15                 push    offset _NPI_MS_IPV4_MODULEID
.text:6EA52B1A                 push    1
.text:6EA52B1C                 call    _NsiGetParameter@36 ; NsiGetParameter(x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x,x)
--- cut ---

The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for netio.sys. Then, it is clearly visible that bytes at the aforementioned offsets are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools (0x3d or '=' in this case), and would otherwise contain leftover data that was previously stored in that memory region:

--- cut ---
Number of Adapters: 1

Adapter Index[0]: 11
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 01 01 00[3d 3d 3d].............===
00000010: 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 30 75 00 00 e8 03 00 00 c0 27 09 00 03 00 00 00 0u.......'......
00000030: 01 00 00 00 64 19 00 00 0b 00 00 00 0b 00 00 00 ....d...........
00000040: 0b 00 00 00 0b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
00000050: 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
00000060: 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................
00000070: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 dc 05 00 00 40 00 00 00 ............@...
00000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[3d 3d 3d]08 07 00 00 .........===....
000000a0: 01 00 00 00[3d]00[3d 3d]00 00 00 00[3d 3d 3d 3d]....=.==....====
000000b0: 6b 0a 34 00 00 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? k.4.............
--- cut ---

At least one local network adapter must be installed on the tested machine to observe the bug. The PoC source code is based on the code sample from https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365947(v=vs.85).aspx (in order to list network interfaces) and http://www.nynaeve.net/Code/GetInterfaceMetric.cpp (in order to resolve and call NSI!NsiGetParameter).

Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become visible to the public.
 
NsippGetParameter.cpp
3.6 KB View Download
Project Member Comment 1 by mjurczyk@google.com, Apr 21 2017
Labels: MSRC-38322 Reported-2017-Apr-21
Project Member Comment 2 by mjurczyk@google.com, Jun 20
Labels: CVE-2017-8564
Project Member Comment 3 by mjurczyk@google.com, Jul 12
Labels: Fixed-2017-Jul-11
Status: Fixed
Fixed in yesterday's Patch Tuesday.
Project Member Comment 4 by mjurczyk@google.com, Jul 17
Labels: -Restrict-View-Commit
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