We have discovered that the win32k!NtGdiMakeFontDir system call discloses large portions of uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode clients.
The attached proof of concept code (which is specific to Windows 7 32-bit) works by first filling a large portion of the kernel stack with a controlled marker byte 0x41 ('A') using the nt!NtMapUserPhysicalPages system call, and then invoking the affected win32k!NtGdiMakeFontDir syscall. As a result, we can observe that a number of leftover bytes from the stack are indeed leaked to user-mode via the output structure:
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00000000: 01 00 00 00 00 02 95 00 00 00 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 ..........Window
00000010: 73 21 20 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 21 20 57 69 6e 64 s! Windows! Wind
00000020: 6f 77 73 21 00 10 03 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ows!............
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 40 00 08 48 00 48 00 66 06 .......@..H.H.f.
00000050: 00 00 1b 02 00 00 00 f4 01 00 00 00 00 08 07 e8 ................
00000060: 03 86 02 1f a8 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 76 00 00 .............v..
00000070: 00 08 00 00 00 41 77 69 6e 65 5f 74 65 73 74 00 .....Awine_test.
00000080: 77 69 6e 65 5f 74 65 73 74 00 4d 65 64 69 75 6d wine_test.Medium
00000090: 00 41 41 41 41 00 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 .AAAA.AAAAAAAAAA
000000a0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 00 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAA.AAAAAA
000000b0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 00 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
000000c0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000000d0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000000e0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000000f0: 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? AAAAAAAAAAA.....
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In order for the PoC program to work, the attached wine_test.ttf font must be present in the current working directory.
Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become visible to the public.
