Disallow disabling Site Isolation via desktop Enterprise Policies |
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Issue descriptionCurrently Site Isolation may be disabled on desktop via Enterprise Policies. This seems undesirable because of the following: 1. Running without Site Isolation is not well supported on desktop. For example - there are no bots running browser_tests in this mode and we are aware of some failures/bugs that might have crept in. 2. Code hygiene - ability to disable Site Isolation from Enterprise Policy code requires extra code complexity. See for example the back and forth on https://crrev.com/c/1318443 3. There are no major functionality bugs left (ergo there should be no reason why enterprises might want to disable Site Isolation).
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Dec 3
Assigning to desktop PM to lead conversation about deprecating the policy.
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Dec 3
RE: #c2:
Just a small clarification:
1. SitePerProcess enterprise policy may be used to
1.1. disable Site Isolation (by explicitly setting the policy to false)
1.2. force-enable site-per-process mode of Site Isolation
(by explicitly setting the policy to true)
- this is usually a no-op, because site-per-process is already
a default on desktop since M67
- the only scenario where this is not a no-op is forcing Site Isolation
for users who attempt to opt-out via
chrome://flags/#site-isolation-trial-opt-out
2. IsolateOrigins enterprise policy may be used to
2.1. disable Site Isolation (by explicitly setting the policy to an empty list of origins)
2.2. add *additional* origins that should be isolated by Site Isolation
This bug is about removing support for 1.1 and 2.1.
This bug is NOT about removing the policies altogether.
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Dec 5
lukasza, I don't understand 2.2... If force-enabling site-per-process is a no-op (as per 1.2), wouldn't adding sites explicitly also be a no-op? I actually read this as we *should* remove the policies altogether. If they only have a security-increasing effect when users modify flags, they're really not doing much. Admins who wish to prohibit users from modifying behavior using flags should probably do that wholesale by blacklisting chrome://flags
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Dec 5
,
Dec 5
site = eTLD+1 (e.g. example.com or example.co.uk) origin = any origin (e.g. corp.example.com or prod.example.com) site-per-process is turned on by default since M67. Isolating additional, sensitive origins requires explicit opt-in via IsolateOrigins (2.2. above). With site-per-process the same renderer process may be shared by mail.example.com and corp.example.com. Enterprise admins may use IsolateOrigins policy to ensure that mail.example.com and corp.example.com never share a renderer process. Therefore, IsolateOrigins has a security-increasing effect even when users don't modify any flags. I agree that the value of SitePerProcess policy is low - it only has a security-increasing effect if users use chrome://flags (or cmdline switches) to disable site-per-process.
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Dec 5
Ah, got it. Thanks. Re questions in Comment #1: Full details at: https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/developers/enterprise-changes Please provide 3 milestones of notice before the change ships to stable. I can help you get this added to the M72 enterprise release notes (since M71 is already going out), which would allow you to target the change for M75. That work? Typically, we ask that you include a policy to temporarily revert disruptive changes for a period of time. Looks like that doesn't really apply here, since you're asking about removing the policy that did exactly that.
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Dec 6
+blumberg as FYI, since we were in touch about the enterprise policies for this earlier this year. Also, let's be clear in the messaging that this is about the desktop policy and not the equivalent Android policy, which will continue to be available to enable or disable for the time being. Comment 7: Agreed that this is about ending the temporary policy for reverting the disruptive change (Site Isolation), now that it has been live for several milestones (M67).
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Dec 6
-blumberg +privard :)
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Dec 6
I've send out an email to chromium-enterprise@chromium.org - see here: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/chromium-enterprise/t3SVLDIEwEg Re-assigning to bheenan@ who will help cover the deprecation in enterprise release notes for M72 (I hear that the work on release notes will happen in 3-4 weeks from now - so setting NextAction field as appropriate).
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Dec 18
FYI this is now included in the M72 enterprise release notes draft
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Jan 2
The NextAction date has arrived: 2019-01-02
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Jan 2
The tentative plan for branching M75 is end of April - let's look at that bug again at that time.
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Jan 7
Great, next action will be M75 then (though the upcoming notice will be repeated in release notes from now until then). |
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Comment 1 by lukasza@chromium.org
, Nov 29Labels: OS-Chrome OS-Fuchsia OS-Linux OS-Mac OS-Windows