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Security: remote code execution attack chain
Reported by
ma7h1a...@gmail.com,
Sep 26
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Issue descriptionVERSION Chrome Version: chrome 70 beta / 69 stable Operating System: windows7 Ignore Sandbox , Ignore Applock , Ignore download restriction , so funny :) combined 3 bugs into logical vulnerability attack chain 1. url spoof popup on sites.google.com , the popup did not show the real origin which open it 2. download safe.txt , bypass the check. 3. user click the button , here comes the calc.exe. online demo : https://sites.google.com/view/userslogin reproduce see rce.mp4 when try to reproduce it by yourself visit http://f.3cm.me/r/chrome_rce.html and edit username variable to yourself as we know python is usually installed like java , but only it did not check the extension , ".py" is blocked by the downloader I also found attack chain by windows itself using file format vulnerability (do not need to install anything) , but I reported it to microsoft , I think it's the right place , when it was fixed by microsoft , then it would be fixed in chrome.
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Sep 27
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Sep 29
confirm it would also affect popular application like java with default installation config. (which use jarfile: in regedit, and do not check extension so bypassed the download check , also bypass the sandbox)
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Oct 1
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Oct 1
The reason for allowing ProgIDs is that the difference between a ProgID and a custom protocol is small, from Windows's point of view. Both are registered under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\<string>\, but custom protocols have an extra "URL Protocol" key with an empty string.
So when we are launching an external protocol, we ought to make sure if the protocol is a valid one by checking a "URL Protocol" key exists under the registered class.
I tested this on Windows by creating a .url file pointing to an iTunes link in Windows Explorer:
[InternetShortcut]
URL=itmss://itunes.apple.com/deeplink?app=music&p=subscribe&ign-refClientId=3z1mamAFz6MRz4XczD3ozBJwRKWNQ
IDList=
HotKey=0
[{000214A0-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}]
Prop3=19,0
When iTunes is installed, this shortcut works properly. But when I remove HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\itmss\"URL Protocol" key, Explorer complains with "Unable to open this Internet Shortcut. The protocol itmss does not have a registered program."
So this would be my suggested fix. But as a quick bandaid, we can also add python.file and jarfile to the denided schemes: https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/chrome/browser/external_protocol/external_protocol_handler.cc?rcl=5e3bf2a1f618d292d253ee5b0236fcd2cb909c50&l=36
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Oct 2
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Oct 2
Tentative patch: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1256208 This also affects Windows 10, by the way.
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Oct 2
nasko, wfh: As Windows experts, would you be able to take a look at comment #5 and see if the fix makes sense to you?
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Oct 2
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Oct 2
the fix in #5 seems reasonable, but I don't know if it might break behavior people are relying on...?
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Oct 2
Probably will, but there is a workaround (adding the relevant registry key) so I'm not overly concerned about breakage.
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Oct 2
+grt for bug visibility
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Oct 8
sorry , the online demo URL changed to http://1vpctucm.3cm.me/chrome_rce.html if you want to check the patch is effective or not, visit it please.
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Oct 8
The following revision refers to this bug: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/d19a75fc26fd0ab1ce79ef3d1c1c9b3cc1fbd098 commit d19a75fc26fd0ab1ce79ef3d1c1c9b3cc1fbd098 Author: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org> Date: Mon Oct 08 18:15:14 2018 Validate external protocols before launching on Windows Bug: 889459 Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208 Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611} [modify] https://crrev.com/d19a75fc26fd0ab1ce79ef3d1c1c9b3cc1fbd098/chrome/browser/shell_integration_win.cc
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Oct 8
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Oct 9
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Oct 15
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Oct 15
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Oct 17
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Oct 22
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Oct 22
Hi ma7h1as.l@ - thanks for the report! The VRP Panel decided that this bug should be tracked as medium severity, and awarded $1,000 - cheers!
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Oct 22
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Dec 3
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Dec 11
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Dec 11
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Jan 15
This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions. For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot |
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Comment 1 by kenrb@chromium.org
, Sep 26Labels: Security_Severity-High Security_Impact-Stable Pri-1
Owner: mea...@chromium.org
Status: Assigned (was: Unconfirmed)