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Linux kernel: CVE-2017-18344: arbitrary-read vulnerability in the timer subsystem |
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Issue descriptionPer http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2018/q3/76 quoted for convenience below. TL;DR: Arbitrary kernel memory read primitive in kernels 3.10 - 4.15 when CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled. Requires native code execution to access. Chrome OS doesn't enable CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE AFAICT, but lakitu does. Given that, setting Impact-None for now, but feel free to adjust for what is appropriate for lakitu. We should probably pick up the patch in our kernels where it applies (fix referenced below). Here's the announcement from oss-sec: Hi! Syzkaller/syzbot found a global-out-of-bounds bug in the timer subsystem of the Linux kernel [1], that is exploitable and can be used to gain an arbitrary-read primitive. This allows to access kernel memory and leak keys, credentials or other sensitive information that is stored there (so the bug has a similar impact to Meltdown). I'll share a PoC exploit in a week. The bug was introduced in commit 57b8015e ("posix-timers: Show sigevent info in proc file") [2] in 3.10 and fixed by commit cef31d9a ("posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify") [3] in 4.15-rc4. The bug only affects kernels that have CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE enabled, which is done by a lot of modern distros. This bug has been fixed in Ubuntu 16.04 [7], but still affects at least CentOS 7 at this moment (at least 3.10.0-862.9.1.el7.x86_64 that I've checked). I haven't checked the other distros. I've contacted linux-distros@ today and was asked to post to oss-security@ right away, since the issue is already public (and has been for the last 8 months, see the timeline below). ====== Description from MITRE [4]: The timer_create syscall implementation in kernel/time/posix-timers.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14.8 doesn't properly validate the sigevent->sigev_notify field, which leads to out-of-bounds access in the show_timer function (called when /proc/$PID/timers is read). This allows userspace applications to read arbitrary kernel memory (on a kernel built with CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE). ====== I thought it would be quite interesting to see when some Linux distros fixed this bug, since there was no CVE requested and assigned until recently. Initially I was only looking at Ubuntu 16.04, here's the related timeline: * Nov 30, 2017 - the bug reported by syzbot [5] * Dec 15, 2017 - the fix committed upstream [3] * Feb 17, 2018 - the fix backported to the 4.4 stable kernel branch [6] * Mar 15, 2018 - the fix added to the Ubuntu Xenial 4.4 kernel branch [7] * Jul 25, 2018 - CVE requested * Aug 2, 2018 - notified linux-distros@ * Aug 2, 2018 - announcement on oss-security@ In this particular case of a somewhat "scary" bug there was a window of 3.5 months between the bug being reported and the fixing commit reaching the Ubuntu Xenial 4.4 kernel branch. This gives some insight into how much time it usually takes for a fix to travel from upstream through stable into a distro kernel when there's no CVE. Compared to the 14 days, that distros are usually given to fix a security bug reported through linux-distros@, that seems rather long. Then I decided to take a look at the CentOS kernel. I was quite surprised to find out that this bug hasn't been fixed there at all. I was under the impression that most Linux distros either follow stable kernel branches or monitor upstream commits for security related fixes themselves. It seems that this is not the case. Perhaps this fix was missed because CentOS 7 kernel is based on the 3.10 kernel version, and the 3.10 stable kernel release stopped being supported in November 2017. This is just one bug though. Right now there are 700+ fixed bugs reported by syzbot [8] and 200+ more, which are still not fixed [9]. Almost none of them have CVEs (if anybody want to practice requesting CVEs, go for it). There are also ~9000 fixes backported to 4.4 stable kernel. Some of them are security relevant and don't have CVEs. On top of that apparently there are ~700 fixes that are missing in the 4.4 stable kernel [10]. It seems that a CVE is required for a particular security related fix to end up in distro kernels, but there are no CVEs requested for most of the bugs that are being fixed. So there's this inconsistency between the Linux kernel community that just fixes the bugs without bothering about CVEs and the distros, which require CVEs to apply fixes to their kernels. Just some thoughts :) Thanks! ====== [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=e4cd90db60c4517094c0ffcb9468de1bf86809e7 [2] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/57b8015e07a70301e9ec9f324db1a8b73b5a1e2b [3] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cef31d9af908243421258f1df35a4a644604efbe [4] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-18344 [5] https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/9mUyHIix2ys/bTLPoT-kAgAJ [6] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/2/17/139 [7] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1756121 [8] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ [9] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/?fixed=upstream [10] https://twitter.com/grsecurity/status/1022599945604526087
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Aug 3
Re missing patches in stable releases: It would be even better if grsecurity would release the list of patches. Of course, they won't, so there is no means to verify it or to actually fix the problem. At the same time they succeeded scaring everyone.
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Aug 3
Patch applied to chromeos-3.18 from linux-3.18.y. Patch does not apply to older kernels.
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Aug 4
The following revision refers to this bug: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/b323eaa30841d0f6ff537e8600eac494e9c2b84c commit b323eaa30841d0f6ff537e8600eac494e9c2b84c Author: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Date: Sat Aug 04 08:59:52 2018 BACKPORT: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify commit cef31d9af908243421258f1df35a4a644604efbe upstream. timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID). The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is not set it accepts any random value. This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond the array bounds. Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID. Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 28ef9653c18539f8123dd668ad3b28289ec0514a git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git linux-3.18.y) BUG= chromium:870649 TEST=None Change-Id: Iacaed6ad142aa23bad7c714502a94716d4a618e1 Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1162360 Reviewed-by: Dylan Reid <dgreid@chromium.org> [modify] https://crrev.com/b323eaa30841d0f6ff537e8600eac494e9c2b84c/kernel/time/posix-timers.c
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Aug 4
Long since finxed in chromeos-4.4+. Patch applied to chromeos-3.18. WontFix (due to risk) in older kernels. The vulnerability exposes kernel memory, and kernel memory leaks all over the place in 3.18 and older anyway, won't apply to stable releases or to older kernels.
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Aug 4
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Nov 10
This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions. For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot |
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Comment 1 by groeck@chromium.org
, Aug 3