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Security: Referrer leak when Chrome Web App is installed on a path (repro issue 791216 on Mac)
Reported by
chromium...@gmail.com,
Jun 29 2018
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Issue descriptionVERSION Chrome Version: 69.0.3476.0 (Official Build) canary (64-bit) Operating System: Mac REPRODUCTION CASE 1. Install the extension 2. Go to http://www.example.com 3. Execute the following JS in the developer console: win = window.open('', '_blank', '') win.opener = null; win.document.write('<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" content="0; url=https://www.whatismyreferer.com/">') win.document.close(); - Observe that the referrer from the current page has been leaked.
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Jul 4
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Jul 6
I'm trying to get more info on why we think referrers should be stripped in this case. This forking heuristic is non-standard and is something we've been hoping to remove, so we should determine if the referrer stripping part of it is a guarantee or not.
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Jul 19
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Jul 27
still waiting for more feedback from dobkin/creis
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Aug 8
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Aug 8
The following revision refers to this bug: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f commit 6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f Author: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org> Date: Wed Aug 08 08:45:26 2018 Remove referrer stripping from our fork logic. This heuristic is Chrome only, and wasn't even consistently applied in all cases, so we should just get rid of it. Websites that wish to control their referrer should use the widely supported referrer policy instead. BUG= 859218 R=creis@chromium.org Change-Id: I8161e3760ed05213f703b9d5117dc1eac64a6786 Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1124329 Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581502} [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/chrome/browser/resources/local_ntp/local_ntp.html [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.h [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client_browsertest.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/chrome/renderer/extensions/chrome_extensions_renderer_client.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/chrome/renderer/extensions/chrome_extensions_renderer_client.h [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/browser/cross_site_transfer_browsertest.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/public/renderer/content_renderer_client.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/public/renderer/content_renderer_client.h [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/public/test/referrer_unittest.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/renderer/render_frame_impl.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/renderer/render_frame_impl.h [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/shell/renderer/shell_content_renderer_client.cc [modify] https://crrev.com/6b771e07ef5cdb4fdc559b61746db4b6664c580f/content/shell/renderer/shell_content_renderer_client.h
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Aug 8
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Aug 8
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Aug 8
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Aug 13
I'm afraid the VRP panel declined to reward for this, though many thanks for the report!
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Aug 13
Thank you so much!! Happy for that :))
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Oct 15
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Nov 14
This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions. For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot |
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Comment 1 by infe...@chromium.org
, Jul 2Labels: M-69 Security_Impact-Stable Security_Severity-Low Target-69 OS-Mac Pri-2
Owner: jochen@chromium.org
Status: Assigned (was: Unconfirmed)