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Status: Unconfirmed
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EstimatedDays: ----
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OS: Windows
Pri: 2
Type: Bug


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please remove trust of GPKIRootCA1 root certificate or sub-ca

Reported by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 20 2018

Issue description

UserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/65.0.3325.162 Safari/537.36

Steps to reproduce the problem:
1. visit https://www.gpki.go.kr sub-CA : CA131100001
2. visit https://www.epki.go.kr sub-CA : CA134100031

What is the expected behavior?
must raise a INVAILD ROOT certifcate error.

What went wrong?
Root CA : https://crt.sh/?caid=122

CA131100001 : https://crt.sh/?caid=272
being run by http://www.gpki.go.kr
list of certificate : https://crt.sh/?icaid=272&identity=%25

CA134100031 : https://crt.sh/?caid=123
being run by http://www.epki.go.kr
list of certificate : https://crt.sh/?icaid=123&identity=%25

1. certificate issued by sub CA CA131100001 does not provide valid OCSP response for a long time.

2. certificate issued by sub CA CA134100031 does not issued with HTTP CRL endpoint and OCSP HTTP endpoint.

Did this work before? N/A 

Chrome version: 65.0.3325.162  Channel: stable
OS Version: 10.0
Flash Version:
 

Comment 1 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 20 2018

it's violation of CA/B Baseline Requirements.

Comment 2 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 20 2018

intermeidate certificate have a invalid CRL endpoint. which is violation of CA/B Baseline Requirements.
Components: Internals>Network>Certificate
Labels: -Type-Bug-Security -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam Type-Bug
Summary: please remove trust of GPKIRootCA1 root certificate or sub-ca (was: please remove trust of GPKIRootCA1 root certificate or sub-ca on windows.)
Labels: Needs-Triage-M65

Comment 5 Deleted

Comment 6 Deleted

Comment 7 Deleted

Cc: awhalley@chromium.org asymmetric@chromium.org
You can disable trust in a root certificate at https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/how-to-remove-a-root-certificate/

You can also contact Microsoft Root Program Management at msroot@microsoft.com to report non-compliance, as detailed at https://aka.ms/rootcert

Comment 10 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 21 2018

i send report to microsoft.

because they trust CNNIC Root yet, i guess microsoft won't consider my report.

Comment 11 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 21 2018

CA134100031 Webtrust audit(most recent)
https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=2260
https://cert.webtrust.org/ViewSeal?id=2259

i think the most problem is there is no way to check if certificate is revoked

Comment 12 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 21 2018

rogue Certificates.
it seems like they are not verifing domain ownership for ssl certificate.

www.testssl.com
https://crt.sh/?id=287853939

www.ssltest.com 
https://crt.sh/?id=34729314

test_btms.seoul.go.kr 
https://crt.sh/?id=290064037

test.*.pen.go.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=282476214

test123.go.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=287836356

*.test.co.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=287836632

arasun.test.co.kr 
https://crt.sh/?id=287314507

www.test1111.co.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=287836414

www.*.posan.ms.kr 
https://crt.sh/?id=39299279

e-csinfo.*.go.kr 
https://crt.sh/?id=100365037
Labels: Triaged-ET TE-NeedsTriageHelp
This issue seems to be out of TE scope as this is related to GPKIRootCA1 root certificate. Hence adding TE-NeedsTriageHelp label. Could someone from dev team please have a look at this issue.

Thanks!

Comment 14 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 22 2018

found more rouge certificates


210.178.100.164
https://crt.sh/?id=25317212

27.101.205.4
https://crt.sh/?id=284354323

61.108.124.4
https://crt.sh/?id=22520376

210.179.139.131
https://crt.sh/?id=16222145

27.101.119.206
https://crt.sh/?id=284281642

DNS:urk (invaild domain)
https://crt.sh/?id=69934958

DNS:eais (invaild domain)
https://crt.sh/?id=26288690

DNS:chs.cdc (non existent domain)
DNS:go.kr (TLD) ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.kr )
https://crt.sh/?id=6817233

Comment 15 Deleted

Comment 16 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 22 2018

many ip address certificates
https://crt.sh/?icaid=123&dnsname=%25.___.___.%25

certificate for commonName "real."
https://crt.sh/?id=30277284

DNS:cert.ust (non existent domain)
DNS:ac.kr (TLD)
https://crt.sh/?id=35679516

multiple common name
*.ssem.or.kr
*.serii.re.kr
*.kkulbaksa.com
https://crt.sh/?id=275519841

Comment 17 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 22 2018

TLD  wildcard certificate which is in public suffix list.
as GPKI is run by Korea Goverment, this can be used for MITM by Goverment.

https://publicsuffix.org/list/

DNS:*.sc.kr
DNS:*.or.kr
DNS:*.kg.kr
DNS:*.hs.kr
DNS:*.ms.kr
DNS:*.es.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=216514419


DNS:*.kg.kr
DNS:*.es.kr
DNS:*.hs.kr
DNS:*.ms.k
https://crt.sh/?id=169761218


DNS:*.go.kr
DNS:*.or.kr
DNS:*.sc.kr
DNS:*.kg.kr
DNS:*.hs.kr
DNS:*.ms.kr
DNS:*.es.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=140593669


DNS:*.sc.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=107698017


DNS:*.or.kr
DNS:*.kg.kr
DNS:*.sc.kr
DNS:*.hs.kr
DNS:*.ms.kr
DNS:*.es.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=93537384


DNS:*.sc.kr
DNS:*.hs.kr
DNS:*.ms.kr
DNS:*.es.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=61150414


DNS:*.kg.kr
DNS:*.es.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=61136851


DNS:*.or.kr
DNS:*.kg.kr
DNS:*.sc.kr
DNS:*.hs.kr
DNS:*.ms.kr
DNS:*.es.kr
https://crt.sh/?id=20687119


more wildcard certs on here : https://crt.sh/?icaid=123&dnsname=*.__.__

Comment 18 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 22 2018

DNS:*.co.kr (which affect more than 600,000+ TLD) but all expired certificate
https://crt.sh/?id=8169164
https://crt.sh/?id=6990343
https://crt.sh/?id=6797278

Comment 19 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 22 2018

affected domain statistics
https://isis.kisa.or.kr/statistics/?pageId=010102

Comment 20 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 22 2018

statistics.png
138 KB View Download

Comment 21 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 22 2018

the real problem is there is no way to revoke the misissued certificate.

Comment 22 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 25 2018

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gsaZcvLY0vwe2humZn_3E3y89huqjPyS_syTHQCqy1Q/edit?usp=sharing
invaild_certificates.xlsx
28.5 KB Download

Comment 23 Deleted

Comment 24 Deleted

Comment 25 by hg5...@gmail.com, Mar 29 2018

CA131100001, CA131100002 is used by Ministry of the Interior and Safety (South Korea)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_the_Interior_and_Safety_(South_Korea)


CA134100031 is used by Ministry of Education (South Korea)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministry_of_Education_(South_Korea)


CA974000031 which is used by Supreme Court of Korea
https://crt.sh/?id=3526559

7.1.2.2.b cRLDistributionPoints
This extension MUST be present and MUST NOT be marked critical. It MUST contain the HTTP URL of the
CA’s CRL service.
=> does not have cRLDistributionPoints with HTTP URL EndPoint

7.1.2.2.c authorityInformationAccess
=> does not have a OCSP endpoint.


leaf certificate of CA974000031 
https://crt.sh/?icaid=1457&identity=%


CA/B BR
7.1.2.3.b cRLDistributionPoints
This extension MUST be present and MUST NOT be marked critical. It MUST contain the HTTP URL of the
CA’s CRL service.
=> does not have cRLDistributionPoints with HTTP URL EndPoint

7.1.2.3.c authorityInformationAccess
=> does not have a OCSP endpoint

CA974000031 and CA134100031 does not have a ability to revoke the certificate

Comment 26 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 4 2018

https://crt.sh/?id=274586180
www.서울신천병설유치원.com

https://crt.sh/?id=284588956
gscst2@snu.ac.kr

https://crt.sh/?id=71279275
 gimhaeeast.gnfire.go.kr
 
https://crt.sh/?id=26756806
"gihoo.damyang.go.kr/index.damyang
museum.damyang.go.kr/museum"


https://crt.sh/?id=19158231
cm.korea.ac.kr`

https://crt.sh/?id=9709628
www.서울신천병설유치원.com
https://crt.sh/?id=7489831
친환경농업센터.kr

https://crt.sh/?id=5663123
hc-lib.or.kr/

https://crt.sh/?id=9923100
www.bukbu-lib.daegu.kr/

https://crt.sh/?id=6015582
pcsec.sje.go.kr/

https://crt.sh/?id=6010752
180.80.31.225/

Comment 29 Deleted

Issued with no OCSP data: https://crt.sh/?id=6990343
It should be untrusted, *.co.kr can MITM google.co.kr.
They are expried but Goverment of Korea can issue anytime while this certificate not untrusted.

Comment 32 Deleted

Comment 33 by ad...@lael.be, Apr 5 2018

Issued to Internal IP.
https://crt.sh/?id=284348972

Comment 34 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 5 2018

Before adding crt.sh url.
Plesae see xlsx file in comment 22
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=823665#c22
Edit: Comment 31, the * .co.kr certificate itself will not work, but recently there was a saying in Korea that ISPs were intercepting HTTPS (to block harmful sites). As a result, it is quite probable that Goverment of Korea will intercept gmail.com or google.co.kr through GPKIRootCA1.

Comment 36 Deleted

Comment 37 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 5 2018

29 certificate with RSA key size < 2048

which is violation of CA/B Forum BR " 2013-12-31 6.1.5 CAs SHALL confirm that the RSA Public Key is at least 2048 bits or that one of the following ECC curves is used: P-256, P-384, or P-521. A Root CA Certificate issued prior to 31 Dec. 2010 with an RSA key size less than 2048bits MAY still serve as a trust anchor."
2048_key.pdf
39.8 KB Download
2048_key.xlsx
82.6 KB Download

Comment 38 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 5 2018

480 certificate with multiple CommonName(NOT SAN)

ex) https://crt.sh/?id=372265569
multiple_common_name.pdf
72.5 KB Download
multiple_common_name.xlsx
40.0 KB Download
100365037 Revoked by CRL. but only 100365037.

Comment 40 by pere...@gmail.com, Apr 6 2018

Regarding Comment #9: The "GPKIRootCA1" is included in Microsoft's trusted CA list, as it was issued by "government". This issue was discussed already in year 2013 [1]. I doubt that Microsoft will remove this certificate unless there is a significant public pressure, implied in this comment by one of Microsoft's moderator at [1]:

> Although they are not verified by third party through WebTrust, we can't assume that a mere lack of third party audit of KISA through WebTrust does not imply that KISA as a topmost CA should not be trusted and insecure, since they acquired their trust as a CA by government internal auditing policy.
> We also found that KISA decided to perform third-party audit in order to gain WebTrust certification as a root CA, as announced in their press release in September 2013.
> This topic is not appropriate to deeply discuss in Microsoft Community, please make an inquiry to KISA for more information.

(translated from Korean original text)

While KISA, MOI and MOE got a WebTrust seal afterwards, third-party audit (also the WebTrust seal itself) should be questioned due to uncaught multiple violations discussed in this bug report and also [2].

Chromium's Root Certificate Policy states "Google Chrome reserves the right to distrust root certificates present in the operating system's root certificate list." This is the just moment to exercise the right.

[1] https://answers.microsoft.com/ko-kr/ie/forum/ie11-windows_7/%EC%A0%9C3%EC%9E%90/a166a80c-e8d5-413b-8c8b-6567b92b3a7c?auth=1 (in Korean)
[2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1451235

Comment 41 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 7 2018

another issue
Distrust the WebTrust Audit of EY (HanYoung) South Korea and KPMG (Samjong) South Korea.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1451578

Comment 42 Deleted

GPKI Says: will revoke any wrong certificate to yesterday(UTC+9) (Ref. http://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=68221)

Comment 44 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 7 2018

some Certificate can't be revoked, because they don't have proper CRL or OCSP EndPoint.

the only way to revoke the certificate is revoke the Sub-CA or Root Certificate.

Or use the Google Chrome CRL Sets
https://dev.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/crlsets

Comment 46 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 7 2018

Edit Comment #44 : as MS Edge and IE does not use CRLset, the only way to revoke the certificate is revoke the intermediate certificate
>Edit Comment #44 : as MS Edge and IE does not use CRLset, the only way to revoke the certificate is revoke the intermediate certificate

This site is bugs.chromium.org, dedicated for Chromium, as such MS Edge and IE business is (IMO) out of scope for this bug.
This issue opened as a blink-dev request 4/7 here
Request to Deprecate and Remove: Trust in existing Korean GPKI certificates
by ylemkimon
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/blink-dev/ujIKn9HUCF4
Yes, cannot revoke. this CA should untrusted.
MOE(CA134100031) Reported: Any wrong certificate was revoked. but some certificate are not revoked(even can be revoked).
Other Sub Certificate Authorities are did not anything.

Comment 51 Deleted

Comment 52 Deleted

Comment 53 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 9 2018

Delete comment ⚐
EPKI CA Still issues Certificate without Domain Control Validation.
thought No One registered for domain "jbedu9.kr", EPKI issued certificate for that domain at 2018-Apr-06
https://crt.sh/?id=385108875
.kr whois : https://whois.kisa.or.kr/eng/main.jsp

Comment 54 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 9 2018

Poor OCSP Server Status From 2018-03-23 ~ 2018-04-10
gpki-ocsp.png
593 KB View Download
uptimerobot-gpki-ocsp-logs.csv
16.8 KB View Download
Cc: susan.boorgula@chromium.org
 Issue 830162  has been merged into this issue.

Comment 56 by hg5...@gmail.com, Apr 28 2018

https://crt.sh/?icaid=1457&identity=%25
https://crt.sh/?caid=1457&minNotBefore=20100101&opt=cablint,x509lint,zlint

Supreme court of Korea CA which is subCA of GPKIRootCA1 issued none BR compliant SSL certificate.

GPKIRootCA1 must have a responsibility for this incident.

Comment 57 by hg5...@gmail.com, Jun 11 2018

i send request to MOI( who operate GPKI Root CA1 and CA131100001) to remove trust of EPKI intermediate Root CA134100031 on 2018-04-27.

but they officially answered to my request that "MOI will not remove trust theCA134100031".

i attached original document and translated english.

Here is list of man in charge of this incident.

한 창윤(CHANGYUN HAN)
a man who is in charge of GPKI Root CA. a man who officially answerd my question.
tel : +82-2-2100-3990 
ref : http://www.mois.go.kr/frt/a07/searchStaff.do?selectedTeamId=1741379&orgnzt_id=1741379&mgrDetailFlag=Y


김 형욱(Hyunwook Kim)
bugzilla :
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/user_profile?user_id=588247
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1377389
email : hyunwookkim@klid.or.kr
tel : +82-2-2031-9831
a man who in charge of technicall part of operating GPKI Root CA1

ref : http://www.klid.or.kr/section/organization/org_info.html?PID=organization1&select_org=16
revoke_request.pdf
152 KB Download
revoke_request_translated.pdf
49.2 KB Download

Comment 58 by hg5...@gmail.com, Jun 11 2018

still, they are issuing None-BR-Compliance SSL Certificates.
"BR certificates should include an HTTP URL of the issuing CA's certificate"

https://crt.sh/?caid=272&minNotBefore=20180101&opt=cablint
https://crt.sh/?caid=123&minNotBefore=20180101&opt=cablint

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