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Issue 814288 link

Starred by 2 users

Issue metadata

Status: WontFix
Owner: ----
Closed: Feb 2018
Components:
EstimatedDays: ----
NextAction: ----
OS: Windows
Pri: ----
Type: Bug-Security



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Security: Privilege escalation via DLL hijacking of Chrome update system

Reported by carlodid...@gmail.com, Feb 21 2018

Issue description

VULNERABILITY DETAILS
First of all let me say that I have read the section "Why arent physically-local attacks in Chromes threat model?" (from https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/security/faq.md ) and I agree with you, more or less.
I mean, I agree if we talk about a dll that is not developed by the same vendor (e.g.: Google Chrome try to load VERSION.dll from C:\Program Files\Google\Update\) but in my opinion the situation changes when the program loads his own dll without checking its integrity.
In this scenario, a simple "problem" become a security issue if the program runs with SYSTEM privilege.
Practically when you open Google Chrome "GoogleUpdate.exe" is started with SYSTEM privilege to check for update. This software tries to load "goopdate.dll" from "C:\Program Files\Google\Update\". Now (even ignoring the fact that an unprivileged user could find a way to put a dll in that path) a user with administrative privileges could insert the dll in that path and grant to himself the same privilege of GoogleUpdate.exe, in this case SYSTEM privilege.
Let me guess your answer: "If someone can put a dll into a path, he can change\modify the executable itself". You're right but this simply means that if you run a program with high privilege, an integrity check should be performed, each time the executable is called, on the exe itself and to all proprietary files it needs.

VERSION
Chrome Version: 64.0.3282.167 (stable, 32 bit)
Operating System: Windows 7 Professional, SP1, 32 bit

REPRODUCTION CASE
1) put a crafted goopdate.dll into the same path of GoogleUpdate.exe (usually C:\Program Files\Google\Update\)
2) Open Google Chrome

Best regards.
 
Components: Internals>Installer
Labels: OS-Windows
Summary: Security: Privilege escalation via DLL hijacking of Chrome update system (was: Security: Privilege escalation using Google Chrome update system)
I'm not aware of any serious attempt in Windows to prevent elevation from ADMINISTRATOR to SYSTEM; an Administrator can run any of a number of commands to cause a target to execute as system. See e.g. https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askds/2008/10/22/getting-a-cmd-prompt-as-system-in-windows-vista-and-windows-server-2008/

> even ignoring the fact that an unprivileged user 
> could find a way to put a dll in that path)

This cannot be "ignored." If you found a way to do that on a system that has not been deliberately misconfigured, this would be interesting.
Hello,

> This cannot be "ignored." If you found a way to do that on a system
> that has not been deliberately misconfigured, this would be interesting.

this could be a good place to start: Microsoft Windows - StorSvc SvcMoveFileInheritSecurity Arbitrary File Creation Privilege Escalation (https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44152/)

anyway I understand your point of view so if you want to close this report it's ok.

Best regards

Comment 3 by wfh@chromium.org, Feb 21 2018

Status: WontFix (was: Unconfirmed)
Okay, closing.
Project Member

Comment 4 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, May 31 2018

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam allpublic
This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

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