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Issue 795351 link

Starred by 3 users

Issue metadata

Status: WontFix
Owner: ----
Closed: Feb 2018
Cc:
Components:
EstimatedDays: ----
NextAction: ----
OS: ----
Pri: 1
Type: Bug-Security



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Security: Invalid certificate accepted for one site is automatically allowed on another site

Reported by sza...@gmail.com, Dec 15 2017

Issue description

This template is ONLY for reporting security bugs. If you are reporting a
Download Protection Bypass bug, please use the "Security - Download
Protection" template. For all other reports, please use a different
template.



VULNERABILITY DETAILS
When using a self signed certificate and it is accepted on a domain, on the other domain the certificate issue is not popped. So if you accept a self signed cert its not related to domain name, its accepted for all site which uses that invalid cert.

VERSION
Chrome version: Latest stable

REPRODUCTION CASE
Create a self signed certificate. Add it to 2 domains, and accept it at one of these domains when browsing. Navigate to the other domain and the cert will be automatically accepted and there is no warning.

 
Components: Internals>Network>Certificate
Labels: Needs-Feedback
Summary: Security: Invalid certificate accepted for one site is automatically allowed on another site (was: Security: SSL Cert acceptance)
This would indeed be a surprising finding. Can you please provide a network log demonstrating this claim? The instructions for doing so can be found here: https://dev.chromium.org/for-testers/providing-network-details

Can you also provide the Chrome and OS version information?
I'm not able to reproduce the described issue using either Chrome 63 or Chrome 65 on Windows.

Comment 4 by sza...@gmail.com, Dec 18 2017

I'll reproduce it, and send necessary files, sorry I did not have time in the past days.
Project Member

Comment 5 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Dec 18 2017

Cc: elawrence@chromium.org
Labels: -Needs-Feedback
Thank you for providing more feedback. Adding requester "elawrence@chromium.org" to the cc list and removing "Needs-Feedback" label.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

Comment 6 by tsepez@chromium.org, Dec 19 2017

Labels: Needs-Feedback
Still awaiting feedback from reporter.
Labels: Security_Severity-Medium Security_Impact-Stable
Howdy, original reporter. Can you please provide additional details requested in Comment #2? At present, this is not reproducible for us.

Thanks!

[Security impact and severity set tentatively based on what they're likely to be if the issue becomes reproducible]

Comment 8 by sza...@gmail.com, Dec 22 2017

hey, yes I'll, I just didnt have time this week but i'll try to do my best and soon send more details.
Project Member

Comment 9 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Dec 22 2017

Cc: tsepez@chromium.org
Labels: -Needs-Feedback
Thank you for providing more feedback. Adding requester "tsepez@chromium.org" to the cc list and removing "Needs-Feedback" label.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot
Project Member

Comment 10 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Dec 23 2017

Labels: M-64
Project Member

Comment 11 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Dec 23 2017

Labels: Pri-1
Labels: Needs-Feedback
Without the needed data from the original reporter, this issue will need to be closed as inactionable.
As noted in #3, I wasn't able to reproduce this in general. The one thing that might be interesting to look at is whether this is a case where HTTP/2 is in use and coalescing has occurred. Coalescing behavior can be surprising and confusing (see e.g. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=789843#c8) but I don't think we should be doing such coalescing in the face of a certificate error. If we do, that seems wrong.

Comment 15 by sza...@gmail.com, Jan 6 2018

I'm so sorry for late response. 
I was issuing this at our customer's production system, but I can not roll back that system to that invalid state,
so I'm trying to setup a dev sys where I can use the same ip and same certificate like there.

In meanwhile I tried to reproduce it, but it was not that easy like I wrote on page, maybe something was special on the environment.
Project Member

Comment 16 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Jan 6 2018

Cc: rsesek@chromium.org
Labels: -Needs-Feedback
Thank you for providing more feedback. Adding requester "rsesek@chromium.org" to the cc list and removing "Needs-Feedback" label.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot
Cc: rsleevi@chromium.org davidben@chromium.org
Before we close this as not-repro, davidben@, rsleevi@ -- Is there anything here that is cause for concern?

Is there any possibility that we're doing H2 coalescing in this scenario in a way where an accepted invalid certificate is allowed for a different host?
So, the logic for H/2 (and QUIC) coalescing is all centered around SpdySession::CanPool(), which is supposed to reject all cert errors ('supposed to' as in - that's what the code is written to do - see https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/net/spdy/chromium/spdy_session.cc?rcl=4f39d6332f9986292ee753e016883d7823fb3741&l=679 )

So I don't think so, I hope not, but without more data, I don't think we have anything we can act on.

Comment 19 by sza...@gmail.com, Jan 23 2018

I'm sorry about it to wasted your time for it.
I'll ask my colleague to set that system certificates back to that certs, and I'll send more details if possible, hopefully on this week, maybe at weekend.
Thank you for your patience.
Status: WontFix (was: Unconfirmed)
If you can get a reliable reproduction case or network logs, please feel free to open a new bug. Thanks!
Project Member

Comment 21 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, May 15 2018

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam allpublic
This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

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