In issue 268640, we plan to prevent renderer processes from receiving responses of correctly labeled cross-site documents, even when the renderer process is exploited.
To gain experience with this blocking logic in the short term, we can launch early versions of it that trust the ResourceType reported by the renderer process. That would let us build a ResourceThrottle that prevents HTML, XML, or JSON documents from being delivered to image tags, etc. We can ignore the XHR case, since a non-exploited renderer will enforce CORS. Doing this first is useful for discovering any compatibility issues that might exist, before we go further and stop trusting the renderer.
A first step toward this might involve turning on the safer parts of the existing renderer-side blocking logic in SiteIsolationStatsGatherer. That would let the first chunk of the response into the renderer but stop reading after sniffing is complete. This is mainly useful if we find the context we need isn't present in the browser process yet.
Comment 1 by creis@chromium.org
, Nov 17 2017Status: Assigned (was: Available)