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Issue metadata

Status: WontFix
Owner: ----
Closed: Oct 2016
Cc:
Components:
EstimatedDays: ----
NextAction: ----
OS: ----
Pri: ----
Type: Bug-Security



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Security: Users may not recognize that password sync is enabled

Reported by 2087den...@gmail.com, Oct 25 2016

Issue description


VULNERABILITY DETAILS
Google Chrome syncs local passwords to an online account what can show passwords in clear text (The Google password service). 
The vulnerability is that Google Chrome ASSUMES that first account logged in is the real user of Chrome. That assumption is so wrong! 
Another user could borrow the computer, use Chrome, Log on Chrome. This way he will get all local passwords synced to his account. 
To delete his tracks, he just delete his Chrome account and everything looks normal to the real user.


VERSION
Chrome Version: [54.0.2840.71 m] Downloaded 25.10.2016 from https://www.google.com/chrome/
Operating System: [Windows 7 with lastest SP and fully patched]

REPRODUCTION CASE
1. Make a brand new installation of Windows 7 with all SP and patches on, Install lastest Chrome from https://www.google.com/chrome/
2. Access a website, login with username and password. Tell Chrome to save the username/password.
3. Close Chrome. Start Chrome. Access same website and ensure that Chrome supply the username and password for the website.

Here is the vulnerability:
Many people don't use the "log on Chrome" functionality. They just use Chrome "offline" - no problem in that (in this scenario).

But when the "Log on Chrome" function is used for the first time, then Chrome ASSUMES! that this user is real owner of the computer/real user of Chrome. 
That assumption is so wrong! But anyway Chrome begins a sync. of the saved passwords to this newly logged in online user account. 
After 2 seconds, the local passwords can be viewed in clear text from another computer pointing at https://passwords.google.com -login with same account used before in Chrome.


I know that Google is not aware of this vulnerability, because then it would have been handled already. 
This vulnerability have been open for at least 8 month...


This is a real life example:
I was not aware that in the last 8 months (at least), I have been collecting usernames and passwords this way for over 30 persons (customers). Just by doing the above procedure. Legally too, because Google Chrome helped me. I have so many passwords now, but the most are not mine...


I am sure that I am not the only one who is doing this. Google Chrome is one of the most used browsers in the world. 
So I guess you now have a very big task. First you need to close the vulnerability and that may be easy, compared to that you need to sort out and remove any passwords that don't belong to the accounts.. (is that even possible?). Good luck. 

I am looking forward for some seriously $$$ for investigating and telling you this.

I run a little company IT+NET, you just call me if you need help.
I am specialized, also in security.

Best regards,

IT+NET
Produktionsvej 8-10
2600 Glostrup, Denmark
Owner: Dennis Siggaard

mail: dennis@itognet.dk
phone: +45 20873979




 
Components: Services>Sync
Summary: Security: Users may not recognize that password sync is enabled (was: Security: Google Chrome reveals passwords to the wrong user)
I believe the report can be summarized as "People sharing a single Operating System user account might reuse a Chrome instance without realizing that it is configured to store and sync passwords." 

In this instance, the reporter is noting that they weren't *intentionally* collecting passwords from other people who used the PC, it just happened incidentally. Even without password sync, a malicious person who wished to collect data from other people sharing the same PC could easily do so by installing a key logger, adding a logging browser extension, or myriad other attacks outlined in the FAQ Question: "Why aren't physically-local attacks in Chrome's threat model" -- https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/security-faq#TOC-Why-aren-t-physically-local-attacks-in-Chrome-s-threat-model-

As noted more generally in https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/2364824?co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&hl=en: "Anyone using Chrome can switch to any other Chrome profile that's signed in on that device. For example, if someone switches to your Chrome profile, they'll be able to see websites you visited. That’s why we recommend only sharing your device with people you trust."

Comment 2 by ta...@google.com, Oct 25 2016

Status: WontFix (was: Unconfirmed)
Thank you for your replies.

Will you verify to me, that this is an issue that Google won't fix, please.

Thank you.
Project Member

Comment 4 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Feb 1 2017

Labels: -Restrict-View-SecurityTeam allpublic
This bug has been closed for more than 14 weeks. Removing security view restrictions.

For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot

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