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Status: Fixed
Owner:
Closed: Jan 2018
Cc:
Components:
EstimatedDays: ----
NextAction: ----
OS: Linux , Windows , Mac
Pri: 1
Type: Bug



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Issue 600441: High rate of RFMF_GET_COOKIES_BAD_ORIGIN renderer kills in the wild

Reported by nick@chromium.org, Apr 4 2016 Project Member

Issue description

The dashboard shows an elevated number of RFMF_GET_COOKIES_BAD_ORIGIN renderer kills, and also some presumably related RFMF_SET_COOKIE_BAD_ORIGIN kills. These are likely due to a logic bug.

We should add temporary logging to determine the cause of these, and fix the underlying problem.
 

Comment 1 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, Apr 8 2016

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/92b0458c1ea209f49ee080151b540611958d7a8d

commit 92b0458c1ea209f49ee080151b540611958d7a8d
Author: nick <nick@chromium.org>
Date: Fri Apr 08 02:54:04 2016

Disarm LockToOrigin for extensions under --isolate-extensions.

--isolate-extensions actually permits render process reuse, unlike
--site-per-process. This means that "one extension per process" isn't a
valid thing to enforce, which hopefully explains the process kills
we have seen in the wild.

Add a test that exercises this. It fails without the fix.

BUG= 600441 
TEST=browser_tests
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation

Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1867683002

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385947}

[modify] https://crrev.com/92b0458c1ea209f49ee080151b540611958d7a8d/chrome/browser/extensions/chrome_content_browser_client_extensions_part.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/92b0458c1ea209f49ee080151b540611958d7a8d/chrome/browser/extensions/process_manager_browsertest.cc

Comment 2 by nick@chromium.org, Apr 19 2016

Status: Fixed (was: Started)

Comment 3 by nick@chromium.org, May 3 2016

Status: Started (was: Fixed)
Re-opening this since these crashes are still happening, though at a much lower rate.

Comment 4 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, May 3 2016

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/0e6e9faae9e11de8684440b128e75569b98c7553

commit 0e6e9faae9e11de8684440b128e75569b98c7553
Author: nick <nick@chromium.org>
Date: Tue May 03 23:34:14 2016

Add DumpWithoutCrashing and crash keys to get more context
for RFMF_SET_COOKIE_BAD_ORIGIN and RFMF_GET_COOKIES_BAD_ORIGIN
renderer kills.

This is all temporary code, which will be reverted after we understand
the issue.

BUG= 600441 
TEST=RenderFrameMessageFilterBrowserTest.CrossSiteCookieSecurityEnforcement
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation

Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1855383002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391396}

[modify] https://crrev.com/0e6e9faae9e11de8684440b128e75569b98c7553/chrome/common/crash_keys.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/0e6e9faae9e11de8684440b128e75569b98c7553/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/0e6e9faae9e11de8684440b128e75569b98c7553/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h
[modify] https://crrev.com/0e6e9faae9e11de8684440b128e75569b98c7553/content/browser/frame_host/render_frame_message_filter.cc

Comment 5 by nick@chromium.org, May 4 2016

The data from the DumpWithoutCrashing cases has come back from canary, and the following seems true:

 - policy->CanAccessDataForOrigin() returns false not because of an origin lock failure, but because the SecurityStateMap::find operation returns false. In other words, there is no ChildProcessSecurityPolicy for this process at all.
 - Thus, these kills don't seem to require any active OOPIF mode. That makes this bug much more urgent than we had anticipated.

Here is a plan of action:
1. As a short term fix, I will simply force CanAccessDataForOrigin to return true always. This should be safe enough to merge into all branches.
2. Then, I will try to understand what the possibilities are to produce this scenario, and work to obtain a repro.
3. In parallel with 2, we can look for patterns in the URLs we see in the crash keys.
4. We'll try to create a browsertest that reproduces this scenario.

Comment 6 by nick@chromium.org, May 4 2016

Current theory of this bug based on code inspection:

ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Remove() is called synchronously on ~RenderProcessHostImpl, but the IO thread MessageFilters may briefly outlive the RPH.

We could could try to repro this, potentially, by doing something like reading document.cookie in a loop, and closing the tab while that goes on.

We might consider doing a PostTask of the Remove operation to the IO thread, but this doesn't help message filters on non-{UI|IO} threads. There are some usages of ChildProcessSecurityPolicy from message filters running on other threads: for example, FileAPIMessageFilter dispatches FileSystemHostMsg_SyncGetPlatformPath to the blocking pool, though it currently doesn't trigger hard failures.

Comment 7 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, May 4 2016

Project Member
Labels: Fracas OS-Mac M-52
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Win Canary 52.0.2724.0 -  1.44 CPM, 19 reports, 19 clients (signature [Dump without crash] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::OnGetCookies)
Win Canary 52.0.2724.0 -  0.61 CPM, 8 reports, 6 clients (signature [Dump without crash] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::OnSetCookie)
Mac Canary 52.0.2724.0 -  2.15 CPM, 3 reports, 3 clients (signature [Dump without crash] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::OnGetCookies)
Mac Canary 52.0.2724.0 -  2.15 CPM, 3 reports, 2 clients (signature [Dump without crash] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::OnSetCookie)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 8 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, May 4 2016

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/470457d18d306a0f32ea548ad111371c24e509e1

commit 470457d18d306a0f32ea548ad111371c24e509e1
Author: nick <nick@chromium.org>
Date: Wed May 04 23:06:18 2016

ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanAccessDataForOrigin workaround to suppress bad kills

 crbug.com/600441  apparently involves a race where we check
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy for a process_id that it doesn't know -- probably
a renderer shutdown race. Returning true instead of false here is a temporary
workaround to suppress these bad kills, which are affecting the non-oopif
user population. This is a tolerable short-term behavior as far as security
is concerned, since CanAccessDataForOrigin is only meant to offer meaningful
protection in --site-per-process mode, which is not yet launched.

BUG= 600441 

Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945173003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391678}

[modify] https://crrev.com/470457d18d306a0f32ea548ad111371c24e509e1/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/470457d18d306a0f32ea548ad111371c24e509e1/content/browser/renderer_host/media/webrtc_identity_service_host_unittest.cc

Comment 9 by nick@chromium.org, May 5 2016

Labels: Merge-Request-51 M-51
Data from crash/ confirm that the above band-aid fix ( https://codereview.chromium.org/1945173003 ) has resolved the problem in the latest canary.

Given the low risk of the fix, I'd like to merge it to the M51 beta channel. It should improve our UMA renderer crashes by 1-2 CPM.

Comment 10 by tin...@google.com, May 5 2016

Labels: -Merge-Request-51 Merge-Approved-51 Hotlist-Merge-Approved
Your change meets the bar and is auto-approved for M51 (branch: 2704)

Comment 11 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, May 5 2016

Project Member
Labels: -merge-approved-51 merge-merged-2704
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/36602ec1b414e65ddd7c55d4a27f167174825d9e

commit 36602ec1b414e65ddd7c55d4a27f167174825d9e
Author: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Date: Thu May 05 22:44:16 2016

ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanAccessDataForOrigin workaround to suppress bad kills

 crbug.com/600441  apparently involves a race where we check
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy for a process_id that it doesn't know -- probably
a renderer shutdown race. Returning true instead of false here is a temporary
workaround to suppress these bad kills, which are affecting the non-oopif
user population. This is a tolerable short-term behavior as far as security
is concerned, since CanAccessDataForOrigin is only meant to offer meaningful
protection in --site-per-process mode, which is not yet launched.

BUG= 600441 

Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945173003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391678}
(cherry picked from commit 470457d18d306a0f32ea548ad111371c24e509e1)

Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1948223005 .

Cr-Commit-Position: refs/branch-heads/2704@{#402}
Cr-Branched-From: 6e53600def8f60d8c632fadc70d7c1939ccea347-refs/heads/master@{#386251}

[modify] https://crrev.com/36602ec1b414e65ddd7c55d4a27f167174825d9e/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/36602ec1b414e65ddd7c55d4a27f167174825d9e/content/browser/renderer_host/media/webrtc_identity_service_host_unittest.cc

Comment 13 by nasko@chromium.org, Dec 6 2016

nick@, is the rate of kills still high? Do we need to do any more work on this issue?

Comment 14 by csharrison@chromium.org, Feb 28 2017

Issue 697023 has been merged into this issue.

Comment 15 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Mar 1 2017

Project Member
Labels: FoundIn-M-58
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Mac Canary 58.0.3026.3 -  1.32 CPM, 2 reports, 1 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 16 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Mar 31 2017

Project Member
Labels: FoundIn-M-59
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Mac Dev 59.0.3053.3 -  0.20 CPM, 1 reports, 1 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 17 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, May 21 2017

Project Member
Labels: FoundIn-M-60
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Mac Canary 60.0.3106.0 -  0.85 CPM, 1 reports, 1 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 18 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Jun 3 2017

Project Member
Labels: FoundIn-M-61
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Mac Canary 61.0.3118.0 -  0.28 CPM, 1 reports, 1 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 19 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Jun 6 2017

Project Member
Labels: OS-Linux
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Linux Dev 60.0.3112.10 -  0.54 CPM, 2 reports, 1 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 20 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Sep 22 2017

Project Member
Labels: FoundIn-M-63
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Win Canary 63.0.3221.0 -  0.10 CPM, 1 reports, 1 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 21 by sheriffbot@chromium.org, Oct 18 2017

Project Member
Labels: FoundIn-M-64
Users experienced this crash on the following builds:

Mac Canary 64.0.3242.0 -  0.95 CPM, 3 reports, 2 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)
Linux Dev 63.0.3236.7 -  0.29 CPM, 1 reports, 1 clients (signature [Renderer kill 79] content::RenderFrameMessageFilter::GetCookies)

If this update was incorrect, please add "Fracas-Wrong" label to prevent future updates.

- Go/Fracas

Comment 22 by creis@chromium.org, Nov 18 2017

Cc: creis@chromium.org
Owner: alex...@chromium.org
Interesting-- we were seeing a pretty steady stream of these renderer kills until 64.0.3256.0 (15 days ago).  Alex, I wonder if one of your recent fixes for LockToOrigin might have put a stop to these?

Crash link:
https://crash.corp.google.com/browse?q=custom_data.ChromeCrashProto.magic_signature_1.name%3D%27%5BRenderer%20kill%2079%5D%20content%3A%3ARenderFrameMessageFilter%3A%3AGetCookies%27&sql_dialect=dremelsql&ignore_case=false&enable_rewrite=true&omit_field_name=&omit_field_value=&omit_field_opt=%3D#-property-selector,+productversion:1000

Comment 23 by alex...@chromium.org, Jan 2 2018

Status: Fixed (was: Started)
I'm guessing that r513607, a fix for incorrect process reuse which went into 64.0.3257.0, helped with this.  I see that this kill appeared in a few other canary versions after that though.  The big spike in 65.0.3286.* is due to issue 792413.  There are a few more versions with a single kill, though none after 65.0.3300.0 - those might be legitimate kills from our site isolation trials?  I'll mark this as fixed for now, but let's reopen or file a new bug if this spikes up again.

Comment 24 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, Dec 14

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/ec08cda18f9773396a600b2f974a9242df8b3be5

commit ec08cda18f9773396a600b2f974a9242df8b3be5
Author: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@google.com>
Date: Fri Dec 14 00:36:35 2018

Remove missing security state workaround in CanAccessDataForOrigin().

- Remove an old workaround that was put in place before site isolation
  was on by default.
- Fixed a test that depended on this behavior to pass.

Bug: 898281,  600441 
Change-Id: I1f08a0d7af59514c84f7eebd5f48027758a0f63b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374831
Commit-Queue: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616524}
[modify] https://crrev.com/ec08cda18f9773396a600b2f974a9242df8b3be5/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/ec08cda18f9773396a600b2f974a9242df8b3be5/content/browser/dom_storage/session_storage_context_mojo_unittest.cc

Comment 25 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, Dec 14

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/0435a1c98b06a29493ce5207d3bf144ae4def1f4

commit 0435a1c98b06a29493ce5207d3bf144ae4def1f4
Author: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Date: Fri Dec 14 22:02:59 2018

Revert "Remove missing security state workaround in CanAccessDataForOrigin()."

This reverts commit ec08cda18f9773396a600b2f974a9242df8b3be5.

Reason for revert: Caused renderer kills.  See https://crbug.com/898281#c8.

Original change's description:
> Remove missing security state workaround in CanAccessDataForOrigin().
> 
> - Remove an old workaround that was put in place before site isolation
>   was on by default.
> - Fixed a test that depended on this behavior to pass.
> 
> Bug: 898281,  600441 
> Change-Id: I1f08a0d7af59514c84f7eebd5f48027758a0f63b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374831
> Commit-Queue: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616524}

TBR=creis@chromium.org,acolwell@chromium.org,mek@chromium.org,alexmos@chromium.org

Change-Id: Ic67afdbd498f1484ca728431427909a049985550
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 898281,  600441 
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1379032
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616840}
[modify] https://crrev.com/0435a1c98b06a29493ce5207d3bf144ae4def1f4/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/0435a1c98b06a29493ce5207d3bf144ae4def1f4/content/browser/dom_storage/session_storage_context_mojo_unittest.cc

Comment 26 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, Dec 19

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64

commit 263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64
Author: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@google.com>
Date: Wed Dec 19 20:39:02 2018

Replace security state workaround in CanAccessDataForOrigin()

- Replace workaround with code that is more strict about enforcing
  security policy during child process shutdown. The old code would
  always allow data access for IDs not in the security_state_ map. The
  new code adds a pending map so we can deal with UI/IO thread races
  during child process removal AND rejects any unknown IDs.

- Fixed a test that depended on the old behavior where unknown IDs
  always allowed access.

Bug: 898281,  600441 , 915203
Change-Id: I26ca1e48536672b05d2310d8a17be47d5b6ef5c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382855
Commit-Queue: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617937}
[modify] https://crrev.com/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h
[modify] https://crrev.com/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64/content/browser/dom_storage/session_storage_context_mojo_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64/content/browser/dom_storage/test/mojo_test_with_file_service.h
[modify] https://crrev.com/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64/content/browser/fileapi/browser_file_system_helper_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64/content/browser/network_service_client_unittest.cc

Comment 27 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, Dec 22

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8

commit b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8
Author: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Date: Sat Dec 22 01:04:27 2018

Revert "Replace security state workaround in CanAccessDataForOrigin()"

This reverts commit 263ce44bb356617e098d2cbad147146e0a36fc64.

Reason for revert: There are still renderer process terminations due to
this CL, see details in https://crbug.com/915203#c9.

Original change's description:
> Replace security state workaround in CanAccessDataForOrigin()
> 
> - Replace workaround with code that is more strict about enforcing
>   security policy during child process shutdown. The old code would
>   always allow data access for IDs not in the security_state_ map. The
>   new code adds a pending map so we can deal with UI/IO thread races
>   during child process removal AND rejects any unknown IDs.
> 
> - Fixed a test that depended on the old behavior where unknown IDs
>   always allowed access.
> 
> Bug: 898281,  600441 , 915203
> Change-Id: I26ca1e48536672b05d2310d8a17be47d5b6ef5c7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382855
> Commit-Queue: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617937}

TBR=acolwell@chromium.org,tsepez@chromium.org,alexmos@chromium.org

# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.

Bug: 898281,  600441 , 915203
Change-Id: I3fa9efdede12c4403ace0df0678049358009e4e4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1389025
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618700}
[modify] https://crrev.com/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h
[modify] https://crrev.com/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8/content/browser/dom_storage/session_storage_context_mojo_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8/content/browser/dom_storage/test/mojo_test_with_file_service.h
[modify] https://crrev.com/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8/content/browser/fileapi/browser_file_system_helper_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/b06974abd43560ae11fe5a98fa63245d0fe3d5f8/content/browser/network_service_client_unittest.cc

Comment 28 by bugdroid1@chromium.org, Jan 16

Project Member
The following revision refers to this bug:
  https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac

commit 220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac
Author: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@google.com>
Date: Wed Jan 16 04:56:55 2019

Replace security state workaround in CanAccessDataForOrigin()

- Replace workaround with code that is more strict about enforcing
  security policy during child process shutdown. The old code would
  always allow data access for IDs not in the security_state_ map. The
  new code adds a pending map so we can deal with UI/IO thread races
  during child process removal AND rejects any unknown IDs.

- Fixed a test that depended on the old behavior where unknown IDs
  always allowed access.

Bug: 898281,  600441 , 915203
Change-Id: I4b164eb3ec1cbb110479b633e73bcd883ef9a604
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1409732
Commit-Queue: Aaron Colwell <acolwell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623114}
[modify] https://crrev.com/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h
[modify] https://crrev.com/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac/content/browser/dom_storage/session_storage_context_mojo_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac/content/browser/dom_storage/test/mojo_test_with_file_service.h
[modify] https://crrev.com/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac/content/browser/fileapi/browser_file_system_helper_unittest.cc
[modify] https://crrev.com/220d502c977ee3d8617f42eef7aea68e6d8c77ac/content/browser/network_service_client_unittest.cc

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