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Expose TLS version for HTTP requests to extensions
Reported by
alex.gay...@gmail.com,
Mar 26 2016
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Issue descriptionUserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.108 Safari/537.36 Example URL: Steps to reproduce the problem: (This isn't a bug, it's a feature request) What is the expected behavior? What went wrong? Currently using the webRequest entrypoint, it's possible for extensions to instrument various parts of an HTTP request, however there's no way to obtain TLS-level metadata for HTTPS requests. This issue is requesting that metadata, specifically negotiated TLS version, be exposed, either on a per-request basis or a per-connection basis (all extensions are currently per-request, so it probably make sense to add it there, even though this is a per-connection parameter) to extensions. One point of complexity is that there are other encrypted protocols, specifically QUIC and DTLS (used for WebRTC), so perhaps encryptedProtocolVersion with "TLS1.0", "TLS1.2", "QUIC<x>", "DTLS1.1" values would provide better flexibility. Did this work before? No Chrome version: 49.0.2623.108 Channel: stable OS Version: OS X 10.11.4 Flash Version: Shockwave Flash 21.0 r0
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Mar 26 2016
There's definitely been interest in exposing HTTPS-related metadata to webRequest, as part of extending the HAR format, in the same manner that request/response headers are exposed. Further, there's been interest in adding a distinct intermediate event between onSendHeaders and onHeadersReceived (or the asynchronous, non-cancelling onResponseStarted), which would execute when a socket had been assigned to the request (since we perform late-binding of sockets), but before the request itself had been written. For example, this would allow the blocking of particular Certificate Authorities, or the enforcement of additional trust mechanisms (without allowing extensions to override distrust) I had closed out some of the older bugs because they became too muddled, but overall, I'm supportive of this, and think that Emily & Lucas' work on the Security Panel / DevTools would facilitate exposing more of this to the renderer. There's some new privacy risks here, but they may already be subsumed into the overall risk of the webRequest API. However, care must be taken, given <webview>'s exposure of webRequest, to make sure we've got everything balanced.
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Mar 27 2016
Ryan, to make I follow, would you want to tie this together with a new "onSocketAllocated" event and expose this information only there?
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Mar 27 2016
No
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Jul 22 2016
Marking as Available to get out of our triage queue (I don't think anyone on the extensions team proper would be implementing this, but if net folks are supportive we'd be happy to have them or someone else contribute a patch).
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Jul 23 2016
If you have a suggestion for where in the code builds the JS object that's passed to the callback, I might take a pass at figuring this out (no promises though).
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Jul 23 2016
The closest approximation is https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/extensions/browser/api/web_request/web_request_api.cc?rcl=0&l=724 That's after the connection is made (onSendHeaders is before), but also after the header information is received. The JS object is constructed at https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/extensions/browser/api/web_request/web_request_event_details.h?rcl=1469215596&l=25
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Jul 24 2017
This issue has been Available for over a year. If it's no longer important or seems unlikely to be fixed, please consider closing it out. If it is important, please re-triage the issue. Sorry for the inconvenience if the bug really should have been left as Available. If you change it back, also remove the "Hotlist-Recharge-Cold" label. For more details visit https://www.chromium.org/issue-tracking/autotriage - Your friendly Sheriffbot
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Sep 22 2017
palmer@/rsleevi@, can we dupe this into Roland's work on issue 628819?
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Sep 22 2017
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Comment 1 by davidben@chromium.org
, Mar 26 2016Labels: -Type-Bug -OS-Mac OS-All Type-Feature
Status: Untriaged (was: Unconfirmed)